Monday, May 17, 2010
Joshua Livingston (FRI)
Should other non-human animals have rights or do animals solely exist in the world to be exploited by humans? In other words, what place do non-human animals have in our moral system? What is it that according to some, humans are thought to have moral status and non-humans do not? To what degree of a moral status should an animal have compared to a human? Should animals merely be used as a means to some human’s end, such as being eaten or experimented on? Should the law promote animal welfare? What are our duties to animals? In order to answer these questions, one must first consider whether animals have consciousness, but not necessarily self-consciousness, and have the potential of rational thinking. For example, one can argue that if you aren’t self aware then you are merely “property” or entirely subject to the will of your owner. For example, a table or a chair can be treated however the owner likes, such as being broken or sold. In order to address the issue of whether animals are merely property, one must question whether animals are capable of and can feel pain. If the animal is able to suffer then they are relevant to the argument of whether they are simple a property. Moreover, by answering the question of whether animals can feel pain one can begin to answer the question of which animals should have rights. Everything depends on whether and to what extent the animal in question is capable of suffering.
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discussion section Friday
ReplyDeleteShould any non-human organism that can feel no pain be treated the same way as animals and should they be given rights? Do you believe giving animals rights fall into the biocentric view or not?
ReplyDeleteAre you applying this to all animals? Or do you think the rights should be distributed first to the most advanced animal, then to the less advanced ones?
ReplyDeleteYou say, "Everything depends on whether and to what extent the animal in question is capable of suffering." Do you think that the ability to suffer is the only factor in deciding if one has intrinsic value?
ReplyDeleteIn some cultures like in Southeast Asia, for example, people sacrifice animals for religious purposes, claiming that the animal wants to give itself to the gods. This is cultural relativism. How would you argue with this ... or would you argue it?
How are you defining a non-human animal? Is it just any living thing that isn't a human, or are you using Bentham's description of a being with a nervous system that can feel pleasure or pain? And how do you propose to measure the degree of pain an animal suffers?
ReplyDeleteEven if the animal in question cannot feel pain, what about their essential role in ecosystems and life? Shouldn't they be given rights too?
ReplyDeleteDo you think Human beings are obligated to protect all the non-human animals even they can not feel pain? and how do you know they can not feel pain?
ReplyDeleteUsing Bentham's view of animal rights, can this way of thought be applied to stem cell research and other experimentation on human beings, such as cloning?
ReplyDeleteAre you suggesting that animals have instrumental value? If so, in what ways can we "exploit" them? If you are using Bentham's argument then humans and animals should be the same since we both feel pain and pleasure. Also, what do you mean by the "extent the animal in question is capable of suffering" ?
ReplyDeleteSay that there was a terrible accident or medical condition in which a person (or another animal perhaps because if it can be present as a disease in humans there is a possibility that those organisms we share most or our genetic code with could suffer from the same ailment)could not feel any pain at all, whether due to an injury or simply being born that way? How would you support the fact that they have the same rights as persons and animals without this condition?
ReplyDeleteHere is a link to a cnn article about this so called "no-pain" disease. Its very informative.
ReplyDeletehttp://www.cnn.com/2006/HEALTH/conditions/01/27/rare.conditions/index.html